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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this study is to explain and analyze why futures contracts 
in Turkey based on interest are not considerably traded. On this regard, 
efficiency of Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) Treasury Bonds and Bills 
Market was examined by discussing efficient bond and bill market 
elements in the first part of the study. In the second part, efficiency of 
ISE Treasury Bonds and Bills Market was analyzed by forming an 
implicit forward curve. In the third and final part, a number of 
suggestions were put forward to ensure a more efficient ISE Treasury 
Bonds and Bills Market and an increase in trading volume of futures 
contracts. 
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Özet 
 
Bu çalışmanın amacı Türkiye’de faize dayalı vadeli işlem kontratlarının 
neden önemli derecede işlem görmediğini açıklamak ve analiz etmektir. 
Bu sebeple çalışmanın birinci bölümünde etkin tahvil ve bono piyasa 
unsurlarını ortaya koyarak, İMKB Tahvil ve Bono Piyasası’nın etkinliği 
incelenmiştir. İkinci bölümde ise İMKB Tahvil ve Bono Piyasası’nın 
etkinliği bir zımni forward eğri oluşturularak analiz edilmiştir. Üçüncü 
ve son bölümde de daha etkin bir İMKB Tahvil ve Bono Piyasa 
olabilmesi ve vadeli faiz kontratlarının daha çok işlem görebilmesi için 
bir takım öneriler sunulmuştur.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Spot Piyasa, Vadeli Piyasa, Hazine Bonosu ve 
Tahvili, Forward Eğri, Etkinlik. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Economy has a variable structure. It is really difficult to forecast its course. 
The world had this experience in 1971, Bretton Woods (BW). Bretton 
Woods System of monetary management established the rules for 
commercial and financial relations among the world’s major industrial 
states. The BW System was the first example of a fully negotiated monetary 
order intended to govern monetary relations among independent states. 
The chief features of the BW System were an obligation for each country to 
adopt a monetary policy that maintained the exchange rate of its currency 
within a fixed value in terms of gold and the ability of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) to bridge temporary imbalances of payments. In the 
face of increasing strain, the system collapsed in 1971, following the US 
suspension of convertibility from dollars to gold. At this time involvement 
of individuals and firms in the debt markets expanded, the risks of incorrect 
decisions increased. So, people need to hedge their portfolio against 
increased risk. Futures and other derivatives were created to hedge the risks 
of investors against interest rates. Futures market can provide price 
discovery, risk management, market efficiency, and operational advantages 
for spot markets. Thus, futures increased the amount of investors in bond 
markets. 
In this dissertation, we investigate the association between ISE Treasury 
Spot Market and treasury futures contracts in Turkish Derivatives Exchange 
(TurkDex) based on linkages (storage, arbitrage, delivery and settlement and 
yield curve) between them. Spot market and futures market affect each other 
significantly while these linkages are working well. 
According to the theory of efficient market, futures prices must reflect all 
available information in the market. If a futures market is not perfectly 
efficient, speculative activity will be higher. Finally, this speculative activity 
affects spot market volatility through an increase. Additionally, there is a 
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bidirectional effect between futures market and spot market. At this stage, 
the efficiency of spot market is important for the efficiency of futures 
market. In this context, we examine whether ISE Treasury Spot Market is 
efficient or not. 
We also investigate the relationship between the implied forward rates and 
realized spot rates for Turkish government bond and bills market. Forward 
rates should reflect the existing information set in the market based on the 
theory of efficient markets. So, while creating an implied forward curve of 
Turkey, we can analyse the efficiency of ISE Treasury spot market. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Spot market and futures market are strongly related. According to Telser 
(1986), this is because lower cost investors prefer to trade in futures 
markets. Instead of storage money or commodity, investors want to trade in 
futures markets. So futures markets give a chance to investors to take a 
position (long, against increases, short, against decreases) in futures market 
instead of buy or sell spot money, stocks, commodity or interest rates. Also 
investors can take a chance to hedge themselves according to any 
extraordinary reflex of markets.   
Protopapadakis and Stoll (1983) examined Law of One Price (LOP) 
between futures market and spot market. Arbitrage is the mechanism which 
keeps LOP. Arbitrage is a type of transaction in which an investor seeks to 
profit when the same good sells for two different prices. The individual 
engaging in the arbitrage, called the arbitrager, buys the good at the lower 
price and immediately sells at the higher price. 
Arbitrage helps markets to be efficient, which is an important role of two 
markets against each other.  Efficiency refers to the state that information in 
the market is known by every investor. Sholes (1998) is the most popular 
academician in the world of financial derivatives. He says that market 
efficiency, CAPM, arbitrage models give him a point of view to build 
option-pricing technology. He thinks electronic development may reduce 
spot and futures market inefficiency and help to reduce cost of financial 
contracts by futures contracts in the computer age. 
Delivery and settlement are one of the important linkages between spot 
market and futures market. At expiration, a futures contract calls for either 
immediate delivery of the item or a cash payment of the same value. An 
expiration futures contract is equivalent to a spot transaction. 
Another important linkage between spot and futures market is yield curve, 
curve of futures prices of spot prices. Meanwhile, an efficient government 
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market needs a benchmark yield curve to forecast interest rate and selection 
of mis-priced securities in active bond portfolio management. Yield curve is 
a graph of term structure. Term structure is the relationship between interest 
rates (or yields) and maturities. Term structure of the interest rate is 
important for policy makers and academicians. Future expectation of 
interest rates affects yield curve by upward-sloping, downward-sloping and 
flatting. If liquidity premium increases fast enough with maturity, it will 
produce an upward-sloping yield curve. 
Especially forward rates and the shape of term structure are important for 
monetary policy makers. The government borrowing program should follow 
a regular and well publicized timetable, and the government debt 
instruments should comprise differing maturities, which will ensure a 
complete range of benchmark yield curve that facilitates pricing of other 
financial instruments.   
Term structure of interest rates is calculated on basis of bond prices. A 
problem at issue is that there is no bond auction at a specific maturity. On 
the other side, some bonds have small liquidity. Mansi and Jordan (2003) 
tell about two problems which may appear when term structure is 
calculated. One of them is the gaps between maturities. It is likely that we 
can not get any bonds at specific maturity. These gaps must be, interpolated. 
The second problem is homogeneity. The problem of homogeneity is that 
bonds have a different cash flow structure, tax preferences, and liquidity 
center at the same maturity. 
By the time it is better to talk about the theories of term structure, in other 
words, theories on yield curve: expectations theory, liquidity preference 
theory, inflation premium theory and market segmentation theory. 
According to the expectation theory, people make some expectations about 
the level of interest rates. If they think interest rates will decrease, the slope 
of yield curve will be negative. Investors think that economy will be slower 
in the future. On the contrary, if investors think that economy will grow 
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higher in the future, in other words, that interest rates will raise, the slope of 
yield curve will be positive. 
Liquidity preference theory says that because of accessing their fund early 
and remaining liquid, investors prefer to invest for short periods rather than 
for long periods. Investors will be enticed into committing their funds for 
long periods of time if the interest rate increases over a large amount of 
time. This theory explains why the yield curve slope is sloping upwards for 
most of the time. And it shows that long term T-bond rates are higher than 
short term T-bond rates. 
Another theory on yield curve is inflation premium theory. This explains 
that if investors think futures rate of inflation will be uncertain in the future, 
they are likely to expect higher interest rate in the long term investments. By 
such movements used according to this theory, the value of long term assets 
is affected more than the value of short term assets. 
The last theory is market segmentation theory. According to this theory, 
investors choose certain segments of yield curve or bond market. Some of 
them choose to invest on basis of short maturity, and the others of long term 
maturity. According to the theory, there is no contact between these 
investors. Banks and companies enable that there are regulations such as 
legal lists, limiting the types of investments. Banks and firms invest on basis 
of short term. For investors, being knowledgeable about any areas may be 
more costly; thus, investors focus on one segment.   
Yield curve builds expectation about the futures. For right expectations 
there must be right information efficiency. Efficiency, according to Fama, in 
the market spot prices reflects all the information, and all investors know 
all. Anomalies, unexpected movements, according to Fama, have no effect 
in the long-term. But in the short-run he cannot explain some changes 
clearly. Market efficiency hypothesis is not clearly well defined up to now. 
Generally, Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) has three forms; 
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Weak Form means that all past market prices and data are fully reflected in 
securities prices.   
Semi strong Form means that all publicly available information is fully 
reflected in securities prices.   
Strong Form means that all information is fully reflected in securities prices. 
Asymmetric information interrupts market efficiency. According to the 
Mishkin (1990), asymmetric information focuses on the differences in 
information available to different sides in financial contracts. That causes a 
decline market efficiency level and credit-rationing problem. Especially at 
financial shocks it interrupts flow of information in financial markets and 
asymmetric information becomes higher. Aras and Müslümov say that 
asymmetric information is very important for capital markets.  Crisis in the 
economy is caused by lack of informativeness in the markets. 
If there is asymmetric information in the market, demand of credits will be 
rising quickly and suddenly. That makes interest rates higher. Credit-
rationing, according to Stiglizt and Weiss (1981) is the situation where 
supply and demand of funds is not equalized by interest rate of loanable 
funds. If interest rates are higher, investors will choose higher-risk projects 
and investors who have chosen less- risk projects will not take any credits. 
If investors choose higher-risk projects, they will be unsuccessful. Bank 
must pay the loss of the rest of investor’s collateral and the lender must pay 
collateral. 
Credit rationing is applied at crisis time. According to World Securities Law 
Report (1996), most of crises were caused by lack of knowledge of 
investment managers and investors about investment vehicles, lack of 
supervision of intermediaries, corporates, banks and investors. Also 
according to Kuprainov (1995), in the example of Baring Bank corporate, 
investors who take position in derivatives market in most countries, misuse 
the system. 
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Krugman (1979) criticizes the politics of developed economies at crisis time 
and says that economies must act towards each other considering Ricardo’s 
comparative advantages. And at crisis time, panic will be caused by 
changing price expectations. Also, Krugman suggests that, because of the 
mass mentality of the trendy, short-term shareholder, investors pull in and 
out of the latest and hottest stocks at crisis time. These results show that 
stock prices become distorted and the market becomes inefficient. So prices 
can not reflect all available information in the market. Prices are 
manipulated by profit seekers. 
At the yield curve, we can see crisis or any shock effects. In case of any 
default risks, bond spreads are wider. Increasing uncertainty increases yields 
on bonds at any maturity.  So yield curve shape can be changed. This event 
affects consumers, credits, swap spreads, default risks and so on. 
According to Piazzesi (2005) swap data have been beneficially applied in 
previous studies of the evolution of the yield curve. Swap is one of the 
factors which affects yield curve dynamics. Investors usually trade at swap 
markets because they are cheaper and protecting two sides of constractions. 
Being more liquid makes swaps and benchmark swap markets more 
important for all the financial institutions and investors. At the same time, 
swap transactions are more flexible than others because we can make 
infinite number of swap transactions. 
Crisis also increases default risk on instruments. Spreads of Credit Default 
Swaps (CDS), the contract protecting against credit risk, will increase at 
crisis time. For example spread of CDS of Turkey increased 13 basis points 
in a day and become 512 basis points. This tells us Turkey is more risky 
than any other countries.  This also affects the yield curve of Turkey. 
While default risk of any corporates or firms increases, investors avoid 
investing them.  Especially in Emerging Markets (EM), government also 
takes a huge position in bond markets. First of all, interest rates will not be 
determined in the market. Secondly, that will make the market incomplete. 
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Finally, corporations or firms can not find credit easily. All these reduce the 
efficiency of the bond market. In incomplete markets, there will be a lack of 
information. Erdoğan and Kayacan (1998) specified that futures market 
efficiency depends on reducing the dominant role of government on 
determining IR. 
Eurobonds are another factor which affects the yield curve dynamics. Their 
yield is much more than the yield of treasury bonds. And their liquidity is 
very high. Investors prefer to invest on Eurobonds than treasury bonds.   
Fabozzi (2007) says that volatility of interest rate is changed by many 
effects like Eurobonds issue, nonconfidence towards the economy, in other 
words, macroeconomic cycle. Role of the volatility of interest rates is 
important for valuing derivatives and certain asset-backed securities. 
Yield curve is important for valuing derivatives for example treasury future 
contracts about the expectation of future rates. If it is short, macroeconomic 
cycle would be ambiguous, futures contracts would be priced wrongly and 
manipulation would increase. Lack of information will convert the market 
into an inefficient futures market. Also speculators love the indefinite, so 
they increase volatility and make a large amount of money. 
Newberry (1987) says future markets need speculators to assume price risks 
and make profits. He also says if all investors are equally well informed and 
no investors have market power, then speculators can not choose 
manipulation. Yes, if all investors equally well informed? Also he says 
increased short term speculative trading volume increases the risk of long 
term and cost of these risks. 
Ireland and Simpson (1985) say that trading appeared to temporarily reduce 
the level of Treasury bill rate volatility but this effect is reduced more when 
futures trading substantially increases much more than that of Treasury bills 
rate. This also depends on speculators because they can easily cover their 
position in the secondary market according to the primary market. 
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Figlewski (1981) examined Government National Mortgage-Backed 
Association (GNMA) market and he found some results. In the futures 
market, larger numbers of GNMA traders were less informed traders, so 
they increased trading volume and volatility in the market. Then futures 
prices were transmitted to the spot market and increased volatility. 
Unlike all that mentioned above, Forewiss GNMA spot market has become 
more efficient since futures trading for these securities began. But he also 
says it is impossible to say certainly that this improvement is depending on 
futures trading. He assumes that speculators are more experienced and 
professional. Therefore speculation helps improving stability in spot market 
but what if many of speculators not very professional and less informed? 
In this study, we discussed Turkish government bond market and found less 
information efficiency. It must be noted that less efficiency can make 
futures market less useful according to Figlewski. In addition, “marking to 
market rule” makes the investor get away from futures market and impend 
to forward market. 
According to Subrahmanyam (1991), risk traders who are precisely 
informed compete more aggressively than those who are imprecisely 
informed improve terms of trade. This result suggests an interesting 
comparison between having private information to enter the price through 
the trade of insiders and trades of security analysts. Subrahmanyam’s 
analysis suggests that allowing insiders to trade may result in a more liquid 
market than analysts. 
In the working paper of Balaban and Kunter (1996), there are some results 
about the financial market’s efficiency. They found that Turkish financial 
market is not informationally efficient with respect to daily changes in 
market liquidity. Meanly, liquidity does not always show efficiency. 
Investors can at least have a chance to develop profitable trading strategies 
by using developments in market liquidity as long as the reported 
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inefficiencies remain in the market. So, speculation effects also raise 
liquidity, not information. 
According to OECD report that we point out above, the following factors 
can make secondary bond market efficient:  
 liquid markets by a large stock of outstanding benchmark issues a and 
repo market financing, 
 safe and sound clearing and settlement systems, 
 transparent and impartial regulatory and supervisory framework, 
 a market-making structure based on primary dealers, 
 liquid futures markets, 
And let’s analyze how these factors make secondary treasury market 
efficient. 
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3. EFFICIENT SECONDARY BOND MARKET 
 
3.1. Outstanding of Benchmark Issues and Repo Market Financing 
 
3.1.1. Outstanding of Benchmark Issues 
Benchmark issues are very important for liquidity of the secondary market. 
In the secondary market, benchmark issue is the most recently auctioned 
Treasury issues for each maturity. A benchmark issue has several critical 
characteristics; this issue must be liquid (transactions should not affect the 
price of security), quality of the issuer must be very strong and overall 
structure of the market for the contract or security must be in integrity. 
Benchmark issues are also important in valuing other securities in the same 
class. More "scientific" pricing of such issues, at a spread over the 
benchmark rate as is done in the United States (U.S.) dollar sector of the 
market, should make for more transparency in the setting of terms and in 
aiding investors to estimate the value of the paper on offer. 
Benchmark securities for uninformed and informed investors allow them to 
create trading strategies that are perfectly aligned with their signals. And we 
can also say that introduction of liquid benchmark securities increases 
liquidity and price informativeness of all existing individual securities. 
Because the individual prefers to trade the security knowledge, benchmark 
issues make informativeness the best and eliminate the exposure to the 
systematic risk. Benchmarks also enhance the development of a corporate 
debt market by providing bankers an efficient tool to hedge underwriting 
risks. The pricing of swaps and options also becomes more efficient. 
According to Subrahmanyam (1991) and Gorton and Pennacchi (1993), 
information sensitivity of benchmark issues is minimized. Benchmark 
securities make lower adverse selection and that make these securities liquid 
and popular. They maximize information sensitivity and encourage 
information production and liquidity. Benchmark securities have liquidity 
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service to all individual securities, this impact differs sharply in the 
prediction of Subrahmanyam and Gorton and Pennacchi. Subrahmanyam 
found that introduction of benchmark security may lower the number of 
security-specific informed investors for securities that have lower weights in 
the benchmark. Gorton and Pennacchi found that the introduction of a 
benchmark security makes traders have homogenous preferences and 
endowment distributions and eliminates all trading in the individual 
securities. 
Shiller (1993) argues that benchmark securities provide information to 
individual investors and help them hedge major income risks and complete 
market. They need to hedge themselves because when they are 
heterogeneously informed or less informed, they are faced with adverse 
selection while trading. So, according to Shiller, benchmark issues are much 
useful for the market liquidity. 
In reality, supply of benchmark is limited. Theoretically, the limited supply 
of benchmark securities can be explained by adverse selection concerns in 
security design. DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) find that the security issuer’s 
private information regarding the payoff of the security may cause 
illiquidity for the security.   
In Turkey, Treasury auctions government bonds and bills. Turkish Treasury 
for improving liquidity in the ISE Treasury Spot Market and forecast of debt 
structure begin to benchmark auctions. In this content, Treasury tries to 
regularly issue benchmark government bonds but in limited amount. 
Monthly issued floating rate and fixed coupon bonds, long term government 
bonds based on TL, long term benchmark bond issued once in every three 
months and this bonds issued every following three months and Treasury 
does not issue FX denominated bonds. 
Economy of Turkey is really very sensitive. In May-June 2006, economy 
was in turbulence and Treasury ceased to issue long term bond. Also 
benchmark issues are affected by such kind of events.  Benchmark issues 
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are traded in ISE. ISE has made some indices for investors to understand 
easily how much their bonds/bills are changed against any events. But these 
indices are not much very helpful to the traders and investors. 
Treasury is not well-functioned and it does not make any benchmark for 
every maturity and maturity of securities is short. Turkish secondary 
government market had 44.777 million $ trading volume in February 2008. 
This volume was led by benchmark government bonds/bills which were 
introduced by Treasury. Portfolio managers added these securities, and 
benchmark interest rate could not be formed for other maturities. 
 
Graph-1: Trading Volume of Benchmark Bonds in Turkey 
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At the Graph-1, we will see the benchmark securities trading volume in 
2000-2007 years. 
Benchmark issues rates have affected and are floating in many events. 
Investors are confused about that situation. At this point, yield curve helps 
investors to be informed about fixed maturity rates. So, yield curve is a 
function of debt instruments rates having different maturities. Akıncı, 
Gürcihan, Gürkaynak, Özel (2006) showed that yield curve of Turkey, 
compared to other countries, is very short. If Treasury issues fixed rate and 
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long term bonds, they can achieve these kinds of challenges. At the same 
time, Treasury issues fixed rate coupon bonds/bills to fill the gap between 
the short term and long term securities. 
The right yield curves allow the investors to obtain information about the 
return of any securities which have different maturities. On the other hand, 
yield curves help CBRT to make policy about how the changes in short term 
interest rates can affect long term interest rates, there is a correlation 
between short term rates changes and long term interest rates direction. 
Short yield curve, limited benchmark issues and benchmark issues not 
created for every maturity lead to the lack of informativeness. 
 
3.1.2. Repo Market Financing 
Repo, repurchase, markets are often called “financing” markets since they 
are effective instruments for collateralized borrowing that are often used to 
finance the purchase of the underlying collateral. A repo has a single 
transaction of combining a spot market sale with a simultaneous forward 
agreement to repurchase the underlying instrument at a later date, often the 
next day. 
In the repo markets, securities function as collateral for rising funds and the 
funds function as collateral for borrowing securities. As a result, market 
participants recognize repo transactions as a risk-free means of raising or 
investing funds against securities as collateral. Of these repo transactions, 
those for borrowing securities are called special repos while those for 
raising funds are called general repos. Special repo transactions generate the 
linkage between the repo market and securities markets, typically the 
government bond market. Duffie’s theoretical insight that bond prices 
should reflect expected profits from future matched book trading, is defined 
as the differences between general and special repo rates and it takes 
advantage of repo spreads. Repo spreads are closely related to the balance of 
supply and demand of the underlying issues in the repo market. 
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According to Duffie (1996), repo rates can be priced differently depending 
on the underlying bonds because expected returns from future matched book 
trading, are reflected in the cash prices of special bonds. 
As explained above, we can see the price linkage between repo markets and 
government bond markets. Meanwhile, the purpose of foundation of repo 
markets is to help investors using stocks/money with short maturities. 
Because of this fact, repo market must be clear before cash market. Repo 
markets help short maturity funds pour into money market at the same time, 
helping long maturity bond securities to be liquid. Also repo markets help 
portfolio managers using bond securities stocks to finance their needing and 
non-financial firms use their excess money. 
So repo market is like hedging for bond securities market. Investors can 
trade in bond market easily and, if they want, before the maturity that sells 
this security in the repo market. And they turn into market to buy other 
security. That increases confidence of the investor towards the security 
market. The common knowledge is that confidence increases liquidity. 
U.S. repo market had a 4300 billion $ trading volume in 2006. Turkish repo 
trading volume was 3848 billion $ in the same year. For the following years, 
the volume was 4300 billion $ in 2007 and 4151 billion $ in the nine months 
of 2008. Turkish repo market has a great liquidity as well as U.S. repo 
market. If we think that U.S. has the most liquid treasury market in the 
world, Turkey has a very good liquid repo market in the world. 
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Table-1: Performance of the ISE Repo/Reverse Repo Market 
 2006  
(Repo-Reverse 
Repo Billion 
USD$) 
2007 
(Repo-Reverse 
Repo Billion 
USD$) 
2008/9 
(Repo-Reverse 
Repo Billion 
USD$) 
Brokerage firms 634 762 746 
Banks 2.668 3.239 3.253 
CBRT+Takasbank 546 300 152 
Total 3.848 4.300 4.151 
The broadening investor base of Turkish repo market individuals has 6% 
share, mutual funds have 5% share of total trading volume. Share of these 
investors must be increased for the most liquid repo market. And also, 
additional firms such as insurance companies must be added into repo 
market. For liquid repo market, foreign investors will be attending. 
Meanwhile, a lack of withholding tax increases attractiveness of repo 
market. 
In Turkish repo market, 15% tax discrimination is applied to the repo 
transactions. Besides, investors put lines among their repo transactions in 
ISE. So this increases OTC market trading volume according to ISE. 
Without a repo market yield curve will lose its importance. Corporates need 
to be price relative to a government curve. Underwriters can only hedge rate 
risk against Interest Rate Swap Curve (IRS). An illiquid repo market 
generates wide swap spreads.  Now that the time seems ripe to swaps: 
The name given to the swap is equivalent to a yield curve. The swap curve 
identifies the relationship between swap rates at varying maturities. The 
meaning of the word of “Swap” is commutation. Two counterparties 
determined the date of cash flows commuted mutually based on one or 
several forward agreements. In the world, it has a really huge transaction 
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volume (In 1997, 25000 Billion $) because of having a cheaper, more 
special and more flexible structure than other derivatives instruments.   
Swaps are different instruments according to forward and futures 
instruments. Here we can write some different features of them: 
1. Futures and forward are used for hedge transactions but 
speculation transactions have the most shares of all transactions, 
but at the swap transactions speculation effects are lower. 
2. Swap transactions have short maturities but future and forward 
transactions are longer. 
3. At the swap transactions, counterparties have benefits at the 
same time, but at the futures and forward transactions, one part’s 
loss is the other part’s revenue. 
4. At the swap transactions, banks are intermediary and there is no 
contract, but forward and futures transactions are made by 
contracts. 
 
3.2. Clearing and Settlement System 
A modern, efficient clearing and settlement system is a principal component 
of the infrastructure necessary for development of securities markets in 
general and the government securities in particular. Clearing and settlement 
system affects the degree of confidence in the market infrastructure and 
determines whether trading in the primary market and secondary market 
flows smoothly, and influences the capacity which a market has to expand. 
Efficient clearing and settlement system contributes to timely and reliable 
settlement government bond trades, causes minimal risk to participants in 
case of institutional failure, and minimal risk to system operators. 
According to the terms of the original trades, that outcome of post-trade 
clearing and settlement is a transfer of ownership of securities against a cash 
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payment. Achieving this require several steps, a number of institutions are 
involved, and there are a variety of associated costs. 
Securities trade can be identified in to six steps. They are drawn up below: 
 Order: The investor (typically an asset manager) instructs the broker 
to execute the trade. 
 Execution via some trading system: This could be through an 
exchange but nowadays a large number of trades are executed via 
alternative trading systems such as electronic networks. 
 Matching: The brokers on each side of the trade confirm the various 
details of the trade (security, quantity, price, arrangements for 
settlement etc.); and obtain positive confirmation from the investor 
(referred to as affirmation) that the trade complies with the original 
order. 
 Netting: A considerable reduction in the value and volume of 
securities trades for settlement can be achieved, by netting off-
setting cash and security flows. The maximum potential for netting 
is when there is a single central counter-party so that all flows can be 
reduced to a single daily payment and single net amount due for each 
security. 
 Clearing: The positioning of securities and the arrangement of 
payment prior to settlement. 
 Settlement: The final transfer of ownership of securities and 
corresponding cash payments. 
Clearing and settlement systems have met many risks. These are: credit risk, 
failure of a counterparty to settle an obligation; replacement risk, market 
loss on an undelivered security; principal risk, loss of security; liquidity risk, 
delay in settlement date due to funding; systemic risk, “domino effect” 
whereby settlement failure cause other participants to fail; legal risk, a state 
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in which claims in law are unclear or may not be uphold and last risk is 
operational risk, a systems break-down. 
A major determinant of systematic risk is the condition of securities 
settlement. The structure of settlement system will vary by country 
circumstance. In developing markets for government securities, authorities 
should place a high priority on establishing a securities settlement 
infrastructure which suits to country and market circumstance. 
Adequate clearing and settlement procedures for cash and procedures for 
cash and securities are basic policy initiatives supporting government 
securities market development. A well-functioning clearing and settlement 
infrastructure will include automated accounts for securities, reliable 
custody arrangements for the recording of securities ownership and a 
settlement system with delivery versus payment (DvP) allowing for same-
day settlement. 
Without an adequate securities settlement infrastructure, there can be 
considerable systemic risks. Failure of one party to a large securities 
transaction can lead to a series of subsequent failures.  
In most countries, central bank centralized the clearing and settlement 
system in government bonds. Most economies introduced DvP system and 
follow book entry system. Some economies have considerably reduced 
settlement risks by adopting electronic settlement system. A settlement 
system based on gross principles requires market participants to be able to 
access intraday or overnight credit facilities from the central bank. This 
raises the issue whether central banks should be responsible for providing a 
credit facility to the participants for clearing and settlement in government 
securities and what consequences this might have for their liquidity 
management operations. 
Transaction costs are another important concern for clearing and settlement 
system.  When transaction costs are high, bond trading could be adversely 
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effected. In Poland, banks are encouraged to avoid the national depository 
for securities settlement when transaction cost is high for settlement. 
Clearing center is a place where, after the transaction, securities are clearing 
the delivery and payment of these securities. Clearing and custody center is 
Takasbank in Turkey. Takasbank is a non-deposit bank and its partners are 
ISE and its 104 members. Share of ISE is 24%, share of brokerage firms is 
36% and share of banks is 40%. It functions like CBRT but it has one 
important difference, bank of issue. In the point of being a transfer bank, 
credit mechanism, functions in the money market, and executes clearing of 
all securities transactions in the ISE, Takasbank is the central bank of capital 
markets. 
Banks and brokerage firms make transformation in money market by 
Takasbank.  Daily trading volume of this market is nearly 1,3 quadrillion 
TL. Money market helps banks and brokerage firms to find short maturity 
funds while they do not need to sell long term bonds. Takasbank gives cash 
and security credits to their members. This service is special for Takasbank 
members. 
Turkey has retained top position in the Emerging Markets Settlement Index 
for the seventh year in succession in 2001. 
 
3.3. Regulatory and Supervisor Framework 
A fundamental prerequisite of an effective government bond market 
development is an introduction of a sound legal, regulatory and supervision 
framework. Before this, government securities market should develop a 
regulatory and supervision framework. The regulation and supervision of 
bond markets, intermediaries, institutional investors and other market 
participants must include systems and procedures to protect investors, to 
promote sound business practices, and to address systemic risk issues. Also 
it should be ensuring equitable, smoothly functioning, and transparent 
markets, as well as protecting investors and consumers of financial services, 
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particularly in the payment and settlement area. It must be clearly defined 
and publicized which government agency or agencies are assigned the 
regulatory and supervisor responsibilities and accompanying powers. 
In assessing the allocation of regulatory and supervisory powers, it is 
important to put the emphasis on functional performance of rules rather than 
on formal (organizational) issues. 
 
3.3.1. Regulatory Framework 
Effective secondary market regulation is necessary to support a viable 
secondary market. Effective regulation of the secondary market should 
include (a) regulation of market intermediaries, (b) market conduct 
regulation (including trading rules) and market surveillance and (c) 
transparency requirements, which will vary according to the choice of 
market structure. 
 
3.3.1.1. Market Structure 
Regulatory issues are related to transparency requirements and trading and 
trading systems will depend on the type of market structure. 
The market is organized in four ways; (a) as an exchange with an order 
book and post-trade reporting, (b) as a dealer-driven market with some 
transparency provided by market intermediary reporting, (c) as an OTC 
market with some electronic reporting or information sharing with or 
without the use of interdealer brokers, or (d) through a combination of these 
trading systems.  
Regardless of the market structure the regulatory authority should have the 
ability to monitor trading and enforce trading rules. Most bond markets are 
OTC or dealer markets, and in this case the regulator may impose post trade 
reporting, record-keeping, and audit trail requirements on market 
intermediaries. If the bond market is an exchange, the securities regulatory 
authority should have the ability to license exchanges and impose 
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requirements for reporting, record-keeping, fair access, and risk 
management on exchanges. 
 
3.3.1.2. Market Conduct 
Fundamental rule pertaining to the market conduct should be included in 
securities regulation. Fraud and misrepresentation, duty to clients, market 
manipulation, and self-dealing should be addressed by these rules. The 
securities regulatory authority may rely on the exchange to carry out market 
conduct regulation and market surveillance, but should maintain appropriate 
oversight of the exchange’s regulatory functions. In order to ensure 
consistency across trading system, the securities regulator considers setting 
out minimum market conduct standards. 
In an OTC market, the regulatory authority should develop market conduct 
rules and should have access to necessary trading records to investigate 
compliance with rules. 
 
3.3.1.3. Financial Intermediaries 
If the market structure relies on the financial intermediaries, regulations of 
financial intermediaries are important. 
Market intermediaries should be subject to entry or licensing standards, 
including proficiency and capital requirements, ongoing capital adequacy 
requirements and to internal control requirements to ensure sound risk 
management and business conduct rules and required to have standards for 
professional conduct. The regulator should have full authority to conduct 
examinations of market intermediaries, impose condition on them and 
enforce compliance with regulations. 
 
3.3.1.4. Exchanges and Securities Dealers Associations, SROs 
An industry body of market intermediaries active in the bond market may 
assist the securities regulatory authority to develop a proper regulatory 
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framework and standards. An industry association might establish 
appropriate dealing or transaction conventions and standards of business 
conduct, and provide expert commentary and advice during policy 
formulation and rule making.  
A formally recognized SRO can assume regulatory responsibility for its 
members, while an industry association can contribute to standard setting 
and policymaking. The securities regulatory authority should have the 
ability to recognize and delegate authority to SROs. The regulatory 
authority should have an effective oversight role over the SRO, including 
the right to conduct examinations, impose conditions, and review and 
approve rules. The SRO should have the authority to enforce compliance 
with its established rules, to be effective in its role. 
 
3.3.2. Supervisor Framework 
Government regulates and supervises the government securities market to 
support its development. An important responsibility is ensuring compliance 
with market rules of conduct through its participants, including rules on 
transparency and adequate disclosure. In the government securities market, 
there is more than one authority exercising supervision over participating 
institutions, the actions of these authorities must be coordinated in order to 
maintain a fair and competitive environment. There is a cross-border 
transaction activity in the government securities market; there will be a 
presence of foreign financial institutions in the domestic market and/or the 
presence of domestic institutions in foreign markets. This international 
aspect will require cooperation between domestic supervisors and their 
foreign counterparts. 
Supervisory practices differ significantly across jurisdictions. This also 
seems to be some discussion on how supervision of the government 
securities market can be best organized under the light of new technological 
developments (in particular ICT and electronic markets), globalization, and 
the supervisory objectives of investor protection and market integrity. 
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The role of Government as regulators and supervisors, the authorities should 
prevent improper market conduct such as market manipulation and insider 
trading. A requirement for information potentially affecting prices to be 
released expeditiously and to all market participants at the same time will 
result in fair and transparent markets. Requiring intermediaries to comply 
with minimum capital requirements and internal control procedures will 
contribute to reducing systemic risk. Also important for minimizing 
systemic risk are reliable systems for settlement of cash and securities 
transactions. Lack of standards in these areas have led to substantial 
problems and often set back the development of government securities 
markets.  
 
3.4. Market-Making Structure Based on Primary Dealers 
Primary Dealers System (PDS) is used for improving the government bonds 
market.  For this it should develop the market needs. Domestic markets 
needs are changing by country, so is PDS. But all countries must have some 
important factors for efficient PDS and secondary treasury markets. 
1. For efficient PDS there have been adequate Primary Dealers (PDs). 
That is for a competitive market. Competitiveness is a minimized 
bid-ask spread, reducing commissions, and improving liquidity of 
secondary government markets. Optimal numbers of PDs are 
depending on conditions of countries. For example, there were 18 
PDs in the USA in 1960, this number increased to 46 in 1988 and 
reduced to 23 between 1999 and 2000. This decrease was depending 
on consolidation of companies.  Turkey has more than 51 banks and 
numbers of PDs are only 10.  This is not a sufficient figure. 
2. There must be adequate investors in the secondary government bond 
market for improving PDS. Insurance companies, mutual funds, big 
and commercial companies and individual investors are the last 
investors. Last investors make secondary markets deeper so are 
made more competitive than primary markets and PDs profits, 
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increasing on the secondary market to increase investor base, 
decrease depending on one or two groups and allocate risks to 
individuals, whereby improving trading volume of government 
bonds. 
3. Interest rates of government bonds/bills must be liberalized. Interest 
rate must show the real supply and demand of the government 
bonds/bills and PDs calculate efficient price of the bonds and bills. 
4. Establishing PDS is based on the behavior of the issuer of the bonds 
and bills.  Debt issuers define strategy of auctions according to risk 
management possibilities to investors; strategy of auctions must 
consist of different types and maturities of government bonds/bills 
and benchmark issues. Types and maturity of government 
bonds/bills must be responding to the market demands, so auctions 
will be successful. 
5. The debt issuer must support improvement of the primary and 
secondary markets.  For this, in the many countries debt issuers do 
not sell the government bonds directly to the individual investors to 
support the PDs. And PDs do not compete with the debt issuers to 
exchange the bonds/bills. To support the secondary market, debt 
issuers must market the government bonds/bills and define 
marketing strategy of the bonds/bills. The technical of auctions of 
the issuing government bonds/bills is tender method. 
6. For efficient PDS there must be a liquid secondary government 
bonds/bills market. If there is no liquid bonds/bills market, it is 
increasing the cost of the PDs because of the transactions which are 
not quick. Also for quick transactions there must be electronic 
sell/buy orders systems. So fund transactions will be easy and lower 
cost. 
7. In the world there have been many crises. PDs must perform risk 
management very carefully because of systematic and non-
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systematic risks. Futures markets are important at this point because 
investors can protect themselves according to systematic risks. 
Efficient PDS is needed for liquid futures markets. 
8. For efficiency PDS needs transparency. Depending on transparency, 
PDS is improving safety of investors. Safety is important in financial 
markets because if investors do not believe the systems they do not 
sell and buy in the markets. So losing liquidity kills the importance 
of the market. 
PDs are institutions which have the exclusive right to submit bids in 
auctions 1  for government bonds. Moreover, a primary dealer has the 
obligation to participate in a "substantial" way in these auctions, to quote 
two-way prices for government bonds on secondary markets with paying 
attention to maximum spread and/or minimum turnover requirements. 
Furthermore, primary dealers may have access to some other privileges such 
as special financing facilities which can be transformed into monetary 
equivalents. PDs have some benefits to secondary markets; (a) improving of 
efficiency of the government securities market, (b) reducing operating costs, 
(c) increasing level of competition, (d) relief of occasional shortfall of 
liquidity, (e) supplying distribution channels, (f) collecting and report of 
market information, (g) easier implementation of monetary policy. 
In market making, parties agree to make prices to each other for the 
purchase and sale of financial assets. Prices are made during pre-agreed 
times, in agreed volumes, with agreed buy/sell spreads, qualification of 
pricing should be monitored on an ongoing basis. 
Market making is a difficult and risky business. However, the degree of its 
difficulty and risks depends on its definition. The most strict form of market 
                                               
1 An auction is a process of buying and selling goods or services by offering them up for 
bid, taking bids, and then selling the item to the winning bidder. In economic theory, an 
auction may refer to any mechanism or set of trading rules for exchange. 
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making requires “continuous quoting (i.e., under any market 
circumstances)” of “firm” “two-way prices” with “a high trading volume” 
or “a narrow spread” or a combination of the two.  Committing themselves 
to buying or selling at prices they quote in an illiquid and volatile market 
environment exposes the PDs to a significant risk. On the other hand, the 
market making by PDs would contribute to enhancing market liquidity. 
Thus, there is a chicken-and-egg problem in considering adoption of a PDS.   
Also there are some impediments to developed in market making; 
 Tap Issues2: If securities are freely available on tap or if auctions are 
frequent, there is little incentive to trade on the secondary market. 
 High liquid asset ratio: Result in institutions holding more assets 
than they desire. 
 Investor Base: Small institutional investor base not motivated to 
manage their risks or a reasonable sized investor’s base but 
concentrated. 
 Small number of dominant market player: Possible collusion and 
lack of competition. 
 Weak market participants. 
 Poor payment and settlement systems: High settlement risks deter 
trading. 
 Interbank credit lines too small for trading: Irregular and uncertain 
issuance pattern and difficult for investors to form expectations 
about future supply. 
 Poor price discovery mechanisms: Developed markets have 
published prices, much in the same way as for shares. 
                                               
2 A procedure that allows borrowers to sell bonds or other short-term debt instruments from 
past issues. The bonds are issued at their original face value, maturity and coupon rate, but 
sold at the current market price. 
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 No hedging mechanisms: there is any access to rental securities, 
undeveloped repo markets. 
 Poorly defined trading conventions: There are no codes of conducts. 
 Taxes: Taxes based on original discount value, transaction taxes, 
withholding taxes. 
Since 1990, debt stock of Turkey has been rising and cost of debt has been 
increasing. This situation has made nominal interest rates and risk premium 
higher, liquidity of government bonds/bills markets lower and the maturity 
shorter. Debt managers look for well conditions for improving government 
debt policy in such bad situations. Within this content, Treasury begins PDS 
for government bonds and bills again in 2002. PDS was started in 2000 and 
working well but in the period between November 2000 and February 2001, 
operation of the system was ceased due to the crisis. PDS was stopped in 
2001 but authorities made many reviews about the basic subject of the 
system and defined new principals of the systems. PDS was started again in 
2002. Working principal of the system before 2002 was declared to the 
community so 10 banks which wanted to be PDs and Treasury made an 
agreement on defined responsibilities for both of them. The first foreign 
bank of PDS is HSBC and the second one is Deutche Bank. 
Responsibilities of banks of PDs are to purchase optimum 3% of 
government bonds/bills monthly and optimum 5% of government 
bonds/bills in every three months, declare bid/ask price of the bonds/bills 
which are traded in the outright purchase and sales market in the ISE are 
chosen from Treasury. PDs must declare to the Treasury what transactions 
they do, what kinds of instruments their portfolio are made of and must 
prepare research sheets on what Treasury needs to learn about the economy 
of Turkey. 
There are some rights to the banks of PDs; they use the title of PDs of 
government bonds/bills, do not use collateral for the auction of government 
bonds/bills, benefit from the non auction method of government bonds/bills, 
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make noncompetitive offer in auctions, act as an intermediary in auction of 
Treasury to public, using additional liquidity from CBRT, etc..  
PDS has made financial markets improved and more liquid, and made 
monetary policy efficient. CBRT supports the PDs for the liquidity by Open 
Market Operation (OMO). 
Turkey has not had enough PDs, nearly 12 according to 51 banks. This 
situation makes the auctions and secondary markets less competitive. In the 
secondary government, bonds/bills market have domestic institutional 
investors, domestic corporation investors and domestic individuals investors. 
Domestic institutional investors, including mutual funds, investment trusts 
and pension funds, have 53% and domestic corporations have 35% volume 
share. Contrary to the equity market, domestic individuals are not active in 
this market.  
Foreign investors’ volume share was around 2% until 1 June 2008, when it 
jumped to 5.6%. One foreign brokerage firm, which started to operate in the 
fixed income market in 2008, generated the entire foreign investors’ trading 
volume. Although there is no available data to verify, it is assumed that 
foreign investors generally prefer to trade T-bills through banks. 
Figure-1: 
 
Source: The Associaition of Capital Market Intermediary Institutions of 
Turkey (TSPAKB) 
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As we see in figure 1, individual investors and foreign investors really have 
a little share. Especially decreasing share of domestic individuals is 
important; we must try working to increase this point. Investor’s base must 
be widened. 
In Turkey, interest rate is defined by supply and demand on secondary 
bonds/bills market. CBRT intervenes in the market with OMO and auctions. 
On the auctions sometimes multiprice method and sometimes on price 
method is applied. 
 
3.5. Liquid Futures Market 
The efficient government bond market needs liquid futures market or vice 
versa. Why do the government bond markets need it? Actually, there is a 
strong linkage between futures market and spot market, government bond 
market. 
Futures contracts are agreements to buy or sell an asset at a future date at a 
price set today. This type of contract allows buyers and sellers to lock-in a 
price today or at least partially offset spot price changes with futures price 
changes. Futures market is an exchange market where futures contracts are 
traded. The prices of futures are related to bonds through several important 
mechanisms. 
These linkages are introduced before, as arbitrage, storage, delivery and 
settlement and yield curve. 
In addition to these linkages, futures markets have several roles; 
One of them is risk management, futures can reduce or increase the risk of 
owning spot items. For example, buying the spot item and selling a futures 
contract reduces the investor’s risk. If the goods price falls, the price of the 
futures contract will also fall. This type of transaction is called hedge. 
The other one is price discovery; many people believe that the price of 
futures is the expected future spot price. Forecasting future prices is a 
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multimillion-dollar industry. Futures markets, however, offer forecasts of 
future prices at virtually no cost to the general public. 
And operational advantages, futures market transaction costs are lower.  
And they have higher liquidity than spot markets. 
And as regards to the last one, market efficiency, bond markets probably 
would be efficient even if there were no futures markets. However, a few 
profitable arbitrage opportunities exist even in markets that are usually 
efficient. The presence of these opportunities means that the prices of some 
assets are temporarily out of line with what they should be. 
Creating of futures idea or needing of futures trading is come from 
investors’ protecting themselves against risk in the future they meet. In the 
literature, some theorists say futures markets stabilize cash markets prices, 
reduce volatility, but some of them say futures trading destabilize the cash 
market prices. 
If speculators in market and they have heterogeneous information they use it 
for making a lot of money. Friedman’s argument (1953) is that speculators 
make profits by moving price towards the correct, i.e. equilibrium level and 
in so doing, tends to reduce the fluctuations of the futures price around the 
best estimate of the future spot price. 
It has been suggested that futures trading may adversely affect cash prices in 
three ways: 
1. Destabilizing speculation in futures markets might be transmitted to 
the cash markets and result in increased price volatility. 
2. Deliverable supplies of securities could become so low that price 
distortions in the cash markets could be precipitated by the attempts 
of holders of futures contracts to cover positions in the cash market. 
3. Fraudulent activities in the futures markets could result in price 
distortions in the cash markets, for example, if the futures markets 
were used to corner or squeeze cash markets. 
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Most of available evidence has been developed from markets for 
agricultural commodities and suffers from the limitation that extraneous 
influences were not adequately controlled. Nevertheless, this body of 
evidence does not support the idea that futures markets increase the 
volatility of cash prices, and there is a slight indication that futures trading 
reduces the variability of cash prices. 
Adversely to extensive evidence from agricultural markets, there appear to 
be few published investigations of the effect of financial futures on volatility 
of spot prices. Froewiss concluded that futures trading does not change the 
variability of spot prices for GNMA pass-through certificates, but 
Figlewski, using a different methodology, concluded that futures trading has 
increased the cash price volatility of GNMA securities. According to him, 
futures trading will increase the price volatility if investors in futures do not 
have as good information as participants in the cash market. Also technical 
factors and manipulation increase volatility. And he says insufficient 
information affects increased price volatility in the cash market. He also 
gives an attention to speculation to hedge ratio for effective market 
speculation and hedge activity will be nearly the same. Marking to market 
idea discouraged hedgers and their using of forward contracts. Dale and 
Workman (1981) find that there is no evidence of speculative destabilization 
in the futures or cash markets for Treasury bills. 
Bessembinder and Segun (1992) find out that unexpected futures trading 
volume is positively related to spot price volatility, but expected futures 
trading is negatively associated with the spot price volatility. They also say 
that their findings are not definite because we can not evaluate to extend to 
which trading in the spot market would differ in the absence of futures 
trading and we do not claim to have controlled for all environmental 
changes that affect volatility. 
Turnovsky and Cample (1985) argue in contrast than in their rational 
expectations model, futures markets always improve the stability of spot 
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market. And they also say if the price elasticity demand is low, we can not 
see stable effect of futures trading on cash market, but by contrasting. It 
affects the spot prices and increase stability. 
The empirical evidence surveyed by Cox (1976) whilst not completely 
unambiguous, supports the view that futures markets do not increase spot 
price instability, often reduce instability. Cox argues that the theoretical 
reason for the improved stability is that the futures market increases the 
information available to traders. 
Also in the working paper of IMF in August 1998, the conclusion reached 
was that introduction of futures does not support to stabilize spot market 
prices. 
But one of the academicians of Turkey, Kurun (2005), proved in his book 
that futures trading on treasury bonds or bills reduce the risk of them. On the 
other hand, he also says data of Turkey’s bond market, statistical knowledge, 
is very little. That is the point. Market efficiency needs more information 
and its effect is for all investors. 
T-bills had bonds futures which have been prepared to trade for investors. 
Interest risk management tool is very important for every investor. They 
want to use T-bill and bonds futures to hedge their positions and make 
profits. And auctions will be very attractive to attend, government would 
also be very satisfied to find easy debt. Turkey must step up this point. 
Erdoğan and Kayacan (1998) say that ISE carry a systematic risk based on 
interest rate (IR). So futures or other derivatives are important for hedging 
versus systematic risk. They point out that IR is determined by government 
bond market. They also point out that government controls the ISE Treasury 
Bond Market. In the ISE Treasury Spot Market it is easy to see crowding 
out effect. Crowding out effect reduces efficiency of the markets for both 
spot market and futures market.  
Futures market and secondary market have affected each other. If secondary 
market can not have efficiency, futures market is not very liquid. And 
according to Figlewski (1981), speculators can easily transfer risk to the 
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spot market and fluctuate spot market. So we can see that ISE Treasury Spot 
Market has much liquidity but not efficiency because of shorter maturity of 
Treasury bonds/bills and that makes yield curve in efficient and the future 
not predictable. Also, the number of market-making banks is not adequate 
for the number of activated banks in the market. Liquidity is provided on 
only benchmark issue, the other maturities bonds/bills have not much 
liquidity. Meanwhile, future instruments value depends on the underlying 
assets, stock, treasury, etc. So having a value problem of the treasury 
bonds/bills leads to wrong pricing of futures instruments.  
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4. A FORWARD RATE CURVE ANALYSIS FOR 
TURKISH BOND MARKET 
 
At this part, we develop an implied forward curve of Turkey one year from 
2006/06/20. 
 
4.1. Forward Rates and Forward Curve 
Forward transaction is an agreement about an asset buying and selling in the 
specific future date signed today.  Forward rates are calculated from spot 
rates. Forward rates show market consensus about the futures interest rates. 
Here are the examples which can compute forward rates from spot rates: 
6 month forward rate 1 year from now 
3 month forward rate 1 year from now 
9 month forward rate 2 years from now. 
You can learn below how to compute 6 month forward rates. 
Thinking an investor has two options; 
Buy a 1 year Treasury bill, or  
Buy a 6 month Treasury bill when it is payable in six months and then buy 
another 6 month treasury bill. 
The two options are equal for the investor if they have the same return for 1 
year. Investor knows 6 month spot rate and 1 year spot rate but does not 
know 6 month Treasury bill rates 6 months from now. In the other words, 
investor does not know 6 month forward rate 6 months from now. Given the 
spot rates, 1 year Treasury bill and 6 month teary bill, 6 month forward rate 
is the rate that makes the same return on Turkish Liras (TL) between two 
options. 
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Below is how that forward rate is computed assuming that an investor buys 
a 6 month Treasury bill for TL X.  At the end of 6 months, the value of this 
investment will be, 
X(1+s1) 
s1 is the one half the bond equivalent yield of the 6 month spot rate. And we 
use f to represent one quarter of forward rate on a 6 month Treasury bill 
available 6 months from now. If the investor wants to rollover his/her 
investment by purchasing that bill at that time, at the end of 1 year from the 
X investment it would be; 
X(1+s1)(1+f) 
Now thinking that in a 1 year treasury bill, if we let s2 represent one half the 
bond equivalent yields of 1 year spot rate, then future TL available at the 
end of 1 year from the X investment would be; 
X(1+s2)
2 
The amount invested is being compounded for two periods, that is why the 
squared term appears. (Each period is six month). If the equation is; 
X(1+s1)(1+f)=X(1+s2)
2 
Is right, then investor will be indifferent when he chooses one of the 
options. 
Determining f is; 
f = 1
)1(
)1(
1
2
2
ts
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We can determine the, 
3 month forward rate 1 year from now. 
6 month forward rate 2 years from now. 
The notation we can use to show 6 month forward rates 1fm where the 
subscript m is refers to the period m maturity from now and subscript 1 
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refers to 1 period rate (6 month). The general formula to determine forward 
rate is, 
1fm= 100*)1
)1(
)1(
(
1
1
m
m
mt
tm
ts
ts
 
At the end, we multiply the solution by 100 to reach the absolute solution 
For instance, suppose 3 month forward rate of 1 year. In terms of our 
notation, m is 4 and seeks 1f4.  The formula is then, 
1f4 = 100*)1
)1(
)1(
( 4
4
5
5
ts
ts
 
At this point, I should explain one important clue of the formula. Sometimes 
we can not find 3, 6, 9 months maturity of bonds. We can get 10, 22, 43 
months rates.  At this time, we can approach the formula by months. The 
formula will be as below; 
mfr= 100*)1
)1(
)1(
(
m
m
mtr
mtr
ts
ts
 
At this notation, m refers to time from now, r refers to maturity from m. For 
example, when we try to find 10 months forward rate from 1 year from now, 
we will use the following formula; 
12f10= 100*)1
)1(
)1(
(
12
12
22
22
ts
ts
 
After this information, we compute an implied Turkish forward rate curve in 
the following part. Forward curve is as important as yield curve. 
Several recent worksheets have been made about the forward curve, which 
is simply using the shape of the yield curve to indicate what the market has 
priced in for future short-term rates. Forward curve is the curve representing 
the prices at which the market is willing to transact future business, today. If 
you want to make a 6-month investment, you can either buy a 6-month bond 
or two consecutive 3-month bonds.  You know what the 6-month rate is, so 
you have to consider where you think the 3-month rate will be 3-months 
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from now. You'll only buy the 3-month if you think the compounded rate of 
today's 3-month plus the forward 3-month will yield more than today's 6-
month. 
Since bond buyers are making these kinds of decisions all the time, we 
assume that the market is efficient, and therefore the 6-month rate is equal 
to today's 3-month compounded with the forward 3-month. This is why 
academics say the forward curve is an "unbiased predictor of future rates."3 
 
4.2. An Implied Forward Curve of Turkey 
We develop an implied forward curve of Turkey one year from 2006/06/20. 
On the day there were some T-bills and bonds simple spot interest rates; 
TRT270607T14    18,96% 
TRT050907T17    20,46% 
TRT171007T10    18,07% 
TRT090408T17    21,48% 
TRT100210T12    18,86% 
TRT190111T13    18,92% 
So we can compute the 3, 4, 10, 32, 43 months forward rates 1 year from 
2006/06/20. At the end, we develop an implied forward rate curve which 
depends on the forward rates we compute. 
Note that the formula for calculated forward rates is approached by months: 
mfr= 100*)1
)1(
)1(
(
m
m
mtr
mtr
ts
ts
 
3 month forward rate (FR) 1 year from 2006/06/20; 
                                               
3 http://accruedint.blogspot.com/2006/08/thoughts-on-forward-curve.html 
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12f3= 100*)1
)1894,01(
)2046,01(
(
)12/15(
t
t
 
12f3= 6,102505487% 
4 month forward rate 1 year from 2006/06/20; 
 
12f4= 100*)1
)1894,01(
)1807,01(
(
)12/16(
t
t
 
12f4= 4,919968168% 
10 month forward rate from 2006/06/20; 
12f10= 100*)1
)1894,01(
)2148,01(
(
)12/22(
t
t
 
12f10= 20,11507085% 
32 month forward rate from 1 year from 2006/06/20; 
12f32= 100*)1
)1894,01(
)1886,01(
(
)12/44(
t
t
 
12f32= 58,41746553% 
43 month forward rate from 2006/06/20; 
12f43= 100*)1
)1894,01(
)1892,01(
(
)12/55(
t
t
 
 
12f43= 86,03315863% 
Thus we can draw forward curve 1 year from 2006/06/20. 
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Graph -2: An Implied Forward Curve of Turkey 
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The implied forward rate curve is created by spot rates in Turkish 
government bond and bills market. If we analyse an implied forward rate 
curve day by day we can see the changes in its shape. 
We can see at the graph that there are big gaps between maturities. Also, 
investors expect very high interest rates in the future. So, the slope of curve 
becomes steeper. 
In 2001, there were no Treasury bonds. Most of maturities of treasuries are 
less than one year. Because of the crisis, no one could forecast one year 
beyond. 
Turkish economy is very sensitive. According to Kupranov (1995) and 
World Securities Law Report (1995), lack of knowledge of investment 
managers and investors about investment vehicles, lack of supervision of 
supreme power made the economy sensitive. At any crisis inside or outside 
of the country, Turkish economy gets in heavy turbulence. These situations 
have made interest rates high and Eurobonds also have made very high 
yields. Therefore, investors have been chose to invest Eurobonds than any 
other securities because of higher yield. 
At last, we refer to the spot rates in 2007 to analyse whether FRs is a good 
predictor or not in Turkey. 
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In the 2007 the spot rates by which were computed FRs are; 
TRT050907T17    16,55% 
TRT171007T10    16,00% 
TRT090408T17    18,26% 
TRT100210T12    17,51% 
TRT190111T13    16,95%, 
As we see above, FRs could not predict futures rate of Turkey. If we analyse 
an implied forward rate curve daily, we can see that it can not predict 
futures rates of Turkish government bonds and bills. 
As a matter of fact, FRs is a good predictor of futures spot rates and FRs 
reflect all relevant information in an efficient market. This empirical 
evidence shows that there are no effective future markets for Treasury bonds 
and bills yet in Turkey. 
At the second part, we examine efficiency of the ISE Treasury Spot Market 
in much different point of views. After that we compute FRs. At many times 
Turkish FRs could not predict futures spot prices. If we could not learn true 
futures spot prices, how will we price futures Treasury bonds/bills? 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between the implied forward 
rates and realized spot rates.  Implied forward rates are obtained from the 
spot rates in Turkish government bond and bills market. We conclude that 
the implied rates would not predict future spot rates. 
According to the theory of efficient markets, one may expect that the 
forward rates should reflect the existing information set in the market. 
However, the realized rates at the end of each maturity time are not 
significantly the same as with the expected rates. This simply may 
demonstrate that the existing information set in bond markets does not 
include all relevant information in the market. 
If a market is not perfectly efficient, then the market participants cannot 
correctly obtain sufficient information and evaluate the asset values in the 
market. It is true not only for the spot prices but also for the forward prices. 
Another approach is related with the liquidity preference hypothesis. 
However, the liquidity preferences are seriously affected by the general 
economic conditions and conjectural variations through the maturity of 
bonds. In case that there has been a significant differentiation from the 
expected rates, and then the participants in the markets can hardly manage 
their liquidity positions.  
As there are no effective futures markets for treasury papers yet in Turkey, 
this study has investigated Turkish bond markets for the empirical evidence.  
As Turkey has experienced certain economic crises that were thought to be 
because of the monetary policies of the CRBT, the investors have been more 
sensitive and even suspicious to any developments and announcements in 
the economy. The lack of confidence is finally affecting the Turkish 
economy and even benchmark issues in bond markets. Besides, Turkish 
benchmark issues are not very regular and also limited with the short term. 
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So the uncertainty increases in the economy. One result in the bond markets 
is observed with the time span of the yield curve and forward.  
Turkey has not well-informated Treasury cash market because of several 
reasons explained above. So, if trading volume of treasury futures in Turkey 
increases, market volatility is likely to rise. It is known that spot market will 
be stabilized when futures trading increases in a well-structured and 
informed market. 
Turkey should make some important changes for developing Treasury cash 
and futures market. Here are our conclusions: 
1. Turkish yield curve and forward curve are short.  They must 
depend on long-term maturity. That gives investors much more 
information. Futures contracts depending on yield curve or 
forward curve can be well-standardized and presented to 
investors. 
2. Calendar of treasury issuance is not regular and definite. That 
also must be in a plan. 
3. Benchmark issues’ limits must be extended. 
4. In outright buy/sale market benchmark issues are the most liquid 
assets which the brokers traded. The other assets should also be 
liquid. Because this situation elicits investors to make their 
portfolio, it depends on only liquid assets. So benchmark interest 
rate could not develop at every maturity. 
5. Futures contracts have doubtful maturity and settlement prices. If 
treasury issuance is taken in a regular figure, that problem can be 
solved. 
6. Primary Dealers System must be improved. For example, foreign 
banks should be provided with easier access. The number of 
primary dealers should be more important. The number of active 
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banks and primary dealers should be in balance like other 
countries, as in Korea. 
7. Supervision system should be an active objective for all 
intermediaries, investors, etc. 
8. In the fixed-income market, the crowding out effect must be 
reduced. If the private sector goes easier, interest rates will be 
determined freely. 
9. Education in every subject is a must. Futures contracts and 
markets are complex. Firms which perform trade between spot 
market and futures market should employ trained persons. They 
must have the right information and make good analysis about 
contracts and the markets. 
10. Deficiency and lack of quality of data is another problem. There 
should be an institution set up for investors who would like to 
make a less risky investment to get the right information. 
Eventually, improving liquidity of futures market depends on effective spot 
market.  ISE Treasury Spot Market is not effective and well-functioned. If 
trading volume of Treasury futures becomes higher in Turkey, then spot 
market can be more volatile and undefinitive. 
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